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SELF INCRIMINATION: THE STATUS OF Miranda WARNINGS IN
TAX INVESTIGATIONS-Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341
(1976).
Filing tax returns at one time or another becomes a part of
every working American's life. In the large majority of cases, the
returns are filed honestly and, if ever audited, receive the approval
of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). But what if this approval is
not forthcoming? Indeed, what if the audit results in a finding of
criminal liability?
The fifth' and sixth' amendments guarantee freedom from selfincrimination, and the right to have assistance of counsel in all
criminal prosecutions. Mirandav. Arizona,3 a controversial decision
which affects many of the contacts between police, government investigative agencies, and the people being investigated by them,
specifically stated these rights among others.' In Beckwith v. United
States,' the Supreme Court was asked to decide "whether a special
agent of the Internal Revenue Service, investigating potential criminal income tax violations, must, in an interview with a taxpayer, not
in custody, give the warnings called for by this Court's decision in
Miranda v. Arizona.
...
IAfter affirming the district court's holding that the statements made by Beckwith were admissible against
him in the ensuing tax fraud prosecution even though he had not
been given the full Miranda warnings prior to the interview, 7 the
Court held that it was the "custodial nature" of an interrogation
which triggered the necessity for adherence to the specific requirements of its Miranda holding.8 Speaking for the majority in
1. The fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United States in pertinent part
provides: "No person . . .shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
...
U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
2. The sixth amendment to the Constitution of the United States in pertinent part
provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . .to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. The full reading of the Miranda rights is as follows:
He [the suspect] must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right
to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that
he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney
one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Id. at 479.
5. 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
6. Id. at 341.
7. Id. at 345.
8. Id. at 346.
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Beckwith,9 Chief Justice Burger stated that previous Supreme
Court decisions' ° specifically stressed the custodial factor and confined their rulings to situations where this factor was present. Since
Beckwith was at no time taken into custody during the investigation, his claim that he was entitled to the Miranda warnings was
found to be without merit.
I.

STATEMENT OF

FACTS

Two special agents of the IRS met with Alvin Beckwith to ask
him questions about his federal income tax liability for the years
1966 to 1971. These agents first arranged to meet Beckwith at his
home, and later, with his permission, met with him at his place of
employment to investigate other records.
Before the agents took any statements from Beckwith, the senior agent read from a printed card which contained only a portion
of the Miranda warnings." Beckwith responded that he understood
his rights; he was not, however, specifically told that he had a right
to remain silent. Thereafter, he gave statements to the agents which
"covered his sources of income prior to 1972, his cash on hand each
year from 1965 through 1971, and certain other important facts
concerning the preparation of the computations of his 1971 Federal
Income Tax Returns.' 1 2 Both parties stipulated that without Beckwith's abovementioned statements and admissions to use as a
starting point, "the prosecution would not have had a provable case
against petitioner."' 3
As a result of the investigation, a criminal tax fraud proceeding
was instituted. Prior to trial, Beckwith moved to suppress all statements made to the agents on the ground that he had not been given
the warnings mandated by Miranda.
II.

DECISION OF THE CbURT

Beckwith was convicted before the United States District Court
9. Id.
10. E.g., Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1
(1968). See also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
11. Under the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, I cannot
compel you to answer any questions or to submit any information if such answers or
information might tend to incriminate you in any way. I also advise you that anything
which you say and any information which you submit may be used against you in any
criminal proceeding which may be undertaken. I advise you further that you may, if
you wish, seek the assistance of an attorney before responding.
Brief for the United States at 2-3, Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
12. Brief for the petitioner at 3-4, Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
13. Id. at 4.
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for the District of Columbia 4 which refused to suppress the evidence
he had unwittingly given to the IRS investigators. The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court's ruling,"' and the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari" to resolve the differing rulings on this
question by the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Oliver 7 and the
remaining circuit courts in cases within their jurisdictions. The
Supreme Court affirmed the Beckwith ruling," thus resolving the
issue whether or not the full Miranda warnings need to be given to
a person who is under investigation by the IRS but not in custody.
In a majority opinion by Chief Justice Burger, a noted opponent
of the exclusionary rule,"' the Court dispelled any notions that it
would make the Miranda warnings applicable to situations other
than those where there was custodial interrogation or where the
individual was "otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way." 20 The majority refused to accept the proposition
that an individual being investigated by the IRS is under subtle
psychological pressures to reveal certain aspects of his case to the
investigating agents. It thus refused to hold that the individual is
deserving of the full Miranda warnings, at least from the moment
the case is assigned to the Intelligence Division of the IRS, which is
the section that decides whether a criminal prosecution should
ensue. Even though the Court agreed that it is-at this point that the
individual becomes the "focus" of the investigation, it held that this
was not enough to trigger the need for the warnings. Unless the
"focus" of the investigation includes the decision to incarcerate the
individual or deprive him of his freedom of action in any significant
2
way, the Miranda warnings are not required. '
]III.

ANALYSIS

While the Miranda decision did in fact place a great deal of
emphasis on the custodial nature of the interrogation, certain decisions predating Miranda had recognized that coercion can be pres14. The oral opinion of the district court denying Beckwith's motion to suppress evidence is not reported.
15. 510 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
16. 422 U.S. 1006 (1975).
17. 505 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1974).
18. 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
19. See Burger's dissenting opinion in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971).
20. 384 U.S. at 444.
21. 425 U.S. at 345.
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ent in situations other than simple incarceration. For example,
Escobedo v. Illinois22 contained language which suggested that the
duty to warn a party of his rights might depend on the purpose of
the inquiries made by the investigating agents. The Court emphasized that "[wihen the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory-when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a
confession-our adversary system begins to operate . . . and the
accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer. '23 As Professor Steven Duke, a leading commentator on the subject, observes,
"in a non-custodial interrogation, the duty to warn may depend on
the purpose of the inquiries, which in turn may be ascertained by
12 4
gauging the degree of the interrogator's suspicion.
In Beckwith, this degree of suspicion was never in doubt. In
fact, "[tihere was no civil audit by revenue agents that could
[have been] thought of as routine or done at random. The trial
judge assumed that there was never any civil intention on the part
of the Government .... ",25 What then becomes apparent is that
this was a criminal investigation from the very outset, and that its
sole purpose was to gather evidence which could later be used in
prosecuting the unwary Beckwith.
Another passage from Professor Duke is illustrative of the degree of erosion the Miranda principles have undergone at the hands
of the Burger Court in decisions such as Beckwith. Duke's article,
which was written well before the Beckwith decision, correctly
points out that "[i]f the questions are put by one who 'knows' the
suspect is guilty and who, consequently, is engaged in building a
case rather than investigating a possible crime, then his subject may
deserve the Miranda warnings, even though not under arrest."' 6
Thus, "the greater the likelihood that statements obtained will in
fact be offered in a criminal prosecution, the less likely that the
defendant would be willing to waive his privilege and, consequently,
the greater the need for assuring that he knows of his rights."21
Such an argument moves one to reevaluate the original rationale underlying the Miranda decision. What was the reason behind
clearly defining those rights? Indeed, what was the reason behind
22. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
23. Id. at 493.
24. Duke, Prosecutions for Attempts to Evade Income Tax: A Discordant View of a
ProceduralHybrid, 76 YALE L.J. 1, 38 (1966).
25. Brief for Petitioner at 8, Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
26. Duke, supra note 24, at 38.
27. Duke, supra note 24, at 38 n.173.
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the incorporation of the Bill of Rights (in this case specifically the
fifth and sixth amendments) into the Constitution of the United
States? One of the possible answers which immediately springs to
mind is that the Miranda decision and the fifth and sixth amendments were made part of the existing corpus of United States law
to protect the individual from coercion by agents of the government.
Opponents of the exclusionary rule would premise a decision such
as Beckwith v. United States upon the idea that since the government had decided to investigate Beckwith for criminal tax fraud, it
must have had its reasons for doing so and therefore someone as
obviously guilty as Beckwith is undeserving of the full Miranda
rights because a reading of those rights might prevent him from
being convicted? In United States v. Wade,2 8 Justice Brennan,
speaking for the majority, discussed the "critical stage" cases (including Miranda) stating:
[Tioday's law enforcement machinery involves critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at the pretrial proceedings
where the results might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the
trial itself to a mere formality. In recognition of these realities of
modem criminal prosecution, our cases have construed the Sixth
Amendment guarantee to apply to 'critical' stages of the proceedings. . . . The plain wording of this guarantee thus encompasses
counsel's assistance whenever necessary to assure a meaningful
'defense. ' 2
The Seventh Circuit, in decisions worthy of note because of
their readiness to recognize the presence of non-physical coercion,
decided two cases which were heavily relied upon by the defendant
in Beckwith.3 In the first of these decisions, United States v.
Dickerson, the Court stated that "[i]ncriminating statements elicited in reliance upon the taxpayer's misapprehension as to the nature of the inquiry, his obligation to respond, and the possible consequences of doing so, must be equally violative of constitutional protections as a custodial confession extracted without proper warnings."'31

In the second of these decisions, United States v. Oliver, the
Seventh Circuit pointed out that:

28.
29.
30.
413 F.2d
31.

388 U.S. 218 (1967).
Id. at 224-25.
United States v. Oliver, 505 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Dickerson,
1111 (7th Cir. 1969).
413 F.2d at 1116.
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The application of Miranda does not turn on such a simple axis as
whether or not the suspect is in custody when he is being questioned.
As the Court repeatedly indicated, the prescribed warnings are required if the defendant is in custody "or 32otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way.
After proclaiming this, the court correctly acknowledged that
"[tlhe fact of custody is emphasized in the opinion as having the
practical consequence of compelling the accused to make disclosures." 33 The court further noted that "the test [of custodial interrogation] serves the purpose 'of determining when the adversary process has begun, i.e., when the investigative machinery of the government is directed towards the ultimate conviction of a particular
individual and when, therefore, a suspect should be advised of his
rights.'""

But when is the investigative machinery of government directed toward conviction? It is not only when the individual is formally arraigned or charged with a crime that the investigative
machinery of government is directed toward ultimate conviction.
Could it not also be when a special agent of the IRS is assigned to a
case? Judge Cummings in Dickerson observed that it is rare that a
taxpayer would know that he could refuse to produce his records to
IRS agents. Nor would he be likely to make any distinction between
revenue agents and special agents without some explanation as to
the different functions of these two officers.3 5 Another commentator
noted the reasons which prevent the average taxpayer under investigation from using the caution commensurate with the risks involved
in aiding the IRS agents in an investigation of his own resouuces.
First, there is always the fear of incurring a civil tax liability that
hopefully might be avoided by cooperation. Also, the taxpayer may
conclude that lack of cooperation will result in unwanted publicity
about a tax liability. The average citizen, moreover, believes that the
government prosecutes only the recalcitrant, uncooperative individual who is unwilling to pay what he owes. Who would believe the
ironic truth that the cooperative taxpayer fares much worse than the
individual who relies upon his constitutional rights! 31
32. 505 F.2d at 304 (footnote omitted).
33. Id.
34. 505 F.2d at 305, quoting United States v. Turzynski, 268 F.Supp. 847, 852 (N.D.
Ill.
1967).
35. 413 F.2d at 1116.
36. Lipton, Constitutional Rights in Criminal Tax Investigations, 45 F.R.D. 323, 336
(1968).
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Likewise the district judge in Dickerson noted that the average
citizen who is faced with repeated questioning by two government
agents is in an ominous situation to say the least. While "[t]he
Government suggests that the defendant was in no way physically
restrained, . . . we doubt that he really felt free to walk out on the
investigators from the Internal Revenue Service." 37 In fact, there
can be "innumerable factors which act on the taxpayer's mind compelling him to 'cooperate' with the federal authorities."3 The disregard of these "innumerable factors" in Beckwith demonstrates the
way in which the foundation of the Miranda decision is being undermined. It is important to recognize that interviews by IRS agents
are "inherently coercive" in the psychological sense, for the reason
that the agents
[plersonify the authotiry of the federal government, and the ordinary taxpayer does not have either the 'technical knowledge' of his
rights or the 'toughness of fibre' to decline to answer their questions
despite the fact that he may have been warned that anything he says
may be used against him.39
Thus, given the presence of psychological coercion and resulting prejudice, there arises a "need" on the part of the taxpayer to
be warned of his rights. This "need," if one accepts the Miranda
rationale, is the precurser of the "right" that one has to the warnings
embodied in that decision. As Arthur W. Andrews so clearly shows
in his article on the effect of the Miranda and Escobedo decisions
regarding tax investigations, counsel is needed from the very outset
of the criminal investigation to advise the taxpayer of the benefits
and risks of cooperation versus noncooperation with the IRS
agents." 4 0 In fact, acts or omissions constituting noncooperation
with IRS agents during the course of an investigation are admissible
against the taxpayer as evidence on the issue of willfulness, in both
criminal and civil fraud cases.4 ' With this being the present state of
the law, it would indeed be expecting too much of the individual
under investigation to refuse to cooperate with the IRS agents unless
he was fully advised of all his Miranda rights, not just a portion of
them.
37. United States v. Dickerson, 291 F.Supp. 633, 636 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
38. Id. at 636-37.
39: Andrews, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Tax Investigations Under Escobedo and
Miranda: The 'CriticalStage', 53 IowA L. REv. 1074, 1113 (1967).
40. Id. at 1114.
41. Id. at 1114 n.235.
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Two recent cases decided by the Seventh Circuit further show
the erosion of the Miranda ruling. In the first of these cases, United
States v. Sicilia,4 2 the court refused to extend Dickerson to require
Federal Bureau of Investigation special agents to give Miranda
warnings in connection with a request to the defendant for permission to search his company's premises for a stolen fork-lift truck.
The court reasoned that the reading of Miranda rights was not necessary because it was not until the stolen article was actually discovered on the premises that the investigation had progressed to the
point at which the special agents were prepared to make an accusation against the defendant.43 In the second of these two cases, United
States v. Dreske," decided subsequent to Beckwith v. United
States, the court held that a taxpayer did not have to be advised of
his constitutional rights against self-incrimination before he is questioned by an agent of the Collection Division of the IRS prior to the
"formal referral" of the tax investigation to the Intelligence Division
for an investigation of possible criminal violations. 5
Taken together, and in conjunction with Beckwith, these cases
do not bode well for the future of the Miranda rights. In fact, even
the most recent case decided by the Supreme Court dealing directly
with the Miranda rights can be seen as little solace to those who
view the Miranda warnings as a noble attempt at adhering to the
"spirit" of the Constitution as well as the "letter." Although
the
Court reaffirmed its allegiance to Miranda in Brewer v. Williams, "
a very controversial case involving a confessed child killer, the decision was 5-4 with a strong dissent from Chief Justice Burger.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's recent decision of Beckwith v. United
States does much to undermine the Miranda principles as enunciated by the Supreme Court barely ten years ago. Notwithstanding
the even more recent decision of Brewer v. Williams, it appears
that the Miranda principles have come under attack from the Supreme Court itself. The impact of Beckwith will be felt by the average citizen far more than will that of Brewer, since most citizens are
unquestionably more affected by rulings having to do with taxing
than with rulings concerning the rights of suspects in other criminal
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

475 F.2d 308 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied 414 U.S. 865 (1973).
Id. at 311.
536 F.2d 188 (7th Cir. 1976).
Id.at 194-95.
97 S.Ct. 1232 (1977).
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investigations. While the Court's reluctance to expand the Miranda
principles and apply them to methods of "psychological coercion"
by IRS agents is understandable in its caution to prevent every
interaction by government agents and the average citizen from
being prefaced with a mandatory reading of the Miranda warnings,
it is nevertheless regrettable. Through this one decision on the side
of "caution," countless tax evasion convictions will undoubtedly be
made easier. While the result may be laudable in itself, it gives
cause for grave concern if seen as another in a series of decisions
emasculating Miranda. In tax investigations at least, the thrust of
Miranda has been severely limited.
Kevin O'Brien
47.
48.

345 U.S. 22 (1953).
Id. at 36.
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